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Wednesday, October 16, 2024

Banks Create Money out of Thin Air. What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

Banks Create Money out of Thin Air. What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

Tags Booms and BustsThe FedInflationMoney and BanksMoney and Banking

You might rightfully wonder: How can a bank, like the neighborhood bank down the street, “create money out of thin air”?

To answer that question, we must enter the magical kingdom of “fractional-reserve banking,” where deposits are turned into loans, loans are turned into money, and so on. For every old dollar that goes in, nine new dollars come out, created with the stroke of a pen or the click of a mouse. As you may be aware, general deposits are loans by the bank depositor to the bank. However, banks can spin new loans out of old loans, creating a wheel of fortune by lending the same dollar to nine different customers—a feat that, to the uninitiated, is equally quite amazing and frightening!

This financial alchemy is perfectly legal and is in fact carried out with the aid and assistance of central banks everywhere, including our own Federal Reserve. If this wheel of fortune should hit a bump in the road and suddenly fall off its axle, causing the bank to crash, don’t worry because a central bank can do what no one else can legally do: counterfeit new money to set things right, a feat that “all the king’s horses and all the king’s men” cannot do!

Let’s take a closer look at how fractional-reserve banking works. Customer A deposits $10,000 in a checking account at First Bank. First Bank records the cash in its books and credits customer A’s account. The cash is an asset of the bank (a credit), which is offset by the liability to customer A (a debit). First Bank now has cash to lend, subject to government reserve requirements. Reserve requirements, which are established by the Fed, specify the amount (expressed as a percentage of deposits) that a lending institution must hold in reserve, either as vault cash or on deposit with a Federal Reserve bank, in order to guarantee payment of customers’ deposits. The reserve requirement for “reservable” deposits greater than $36.1 million (as of January 3, 2023) at any lending institution has been traditionally 10 percent. As a result, First Bank is free to lend $9,000 of the deposited money, keeping $1,000 in reserve.

Customer B comes into First Bank seeking a car loan. First Bank agrees to lend customer B $9,000. First Bank credits customer B’s checking account for $9,000 and debits an asset account called “loans receivable.” As you will recall, bank loans to customers are “investments” and, therefore, are assets—not liabilities.

At the completion of these two transactions, First Bank’s statement of financial condition would look like this (for simplicity, I have assumed no other transactions).

Table 1: Statement of financial condition of First Bank, December 31, 2022

 

Assets

(Credits)

Liabilities and equity

(Debits)

Cash

 

$10,000

 

Loans receivable

$9,000

 

Deposit liabilities

 

$19,000

Reserves

$1,000

 

Bank equity

 

$1,000

Totals

$20,000

$20,000

Notice that the bank has deposit liabilities of $19,000 and cash on hand of $10,000. Let’s assume that the loan to customer B is for three years, payable with interest in monthly installments. The demand deposits (checking account balances) include the original deposit of $10,000 from customer A plus the proceeds of the loan to customer B of $9,000. Presumably, customer B will spend the loan money on a car in the next few days. Where did the loan money credited to customer B’s checking account come from? Out of thin air!

The wheel turns again when the car dealer deposits the $9,000 proceeds in his bank, Second Bank. Now Second Bank, like First Bank, is free to make loans, subject to the 10 percent reserve requirement. When the wheel finally stops turning, loans of $90,000 have been created on a cash base of just $10,000. As we have seen, that cash is itself a chimera—nothing more than debt wrapped inside more debt.

Table 2: Fractional-reserve banking

Bank

Deposits

Reserves

(10 percent)

 

Loans

First

$10,000

$1,000

$9,000

Second

$9,000

$900

$8,100

Third

$8,100

$810

$7,290

Fourth

$7,290

$729

$6,561

Fifth

$6,561

$656

$5,905

Remaining

banks

$59,049

$5,905

$53,144

Totals

$100,000

$10,000

$90,000

The table above demonstrates that banks can expand the money supply by a factor of ten when the reserve requirement is 10 percent. Historically, the United States reserve requirement has been 10 percent on transaction deposits, such as checking and negotiable order of withdrawal accounts (M1) deposits, and 0 percent on time deposits, such as deposits into savings accounts and certificates of deposit. The 0 percent reserve requirement on time deposits enables banks to expand the money supply by more than a factor of ten.

Some would argue that banks are not really “insolvent,” just at times illiquid—not always having ready cash when needed. However, that’s true only if we consider just one or a few banks at a time. Any bank having a temporary shortage of cash could always borrow the needed funds to make up for the temporary cash shortage. The problem, however, is that all banks are illiquid and, when pricked by some general financial shock, can easily slip into insolvency.

When the reserve ratio is 10 percent, total deposits are reduced by ten dollars for every dollar withdrawn from the banking system. Banks then have to call in loans or sell securities to cover their depositor’s demands for money. This “liquidity crisis” is the reason behind most financial “panics,” bank runs, and similar economic disturbances. It’s “debt on the way down,” but this time on a grand scale!

Effective March 26, 2020, the Federal Reserve reduced bank reserve requirements, get this, to zero! Even prior to this change, reserve requirements only applied to transaction accounts, nonpersonal time deposits, and Eurocurrency liabilities. Everything else was “jokers are wild.” Thus, banks could create as much funny money as the traffic would bear. When reserve requirements are zero, the ability to create money is infinite!

The Fed’s money manipulation is the root cause of our economic problems. Bubbles in housing prices, United States Treasury notes and bonds, and cryptocurrencies—to give but a few examples—and the recent failures of the Silicon Valley, Republic, and Signature banks can all be traced to our monetary policies.

The fundamental issue for most banks is that they are forced to invest “long” but borrow “short,” something no prudent finance manager would ever do. Checking and other demand deposits are short-term liabilities of the bank. Bank loans, such as car loans, are intermediate-term investments. Mortgage loans are long-term investments. Banks also invest in government securities to balance their investment loan portfolio. Investing “long,” however, subjects the bank to interest-rate risks because the value of their investment loan portfolio is inversely related to changes in interest rates. A thirty-year mortgage loan yielding 2 percent is only worth a fraction of a similar loan yielding 6 percent. To be more precise, a $100,000 investment in such an instrument would be worth only $44,280 if interest rates were to rise to 6 percent. If interest rates rise to 8 percent, the value would fall to $31,768, according to the bond price calculator.

Therein lies the trap that Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) fell into—with disastrous results. It’s the trap set by the very nature of fractional-reserve banking:

Over a period of just two days in March 2023, the bank went from solvent to broke as depositors rushed to SVB to withdraw their funds, resulting in federal regulators closing the bank for good on March 10, 2023.

SVB’s collapse marked the second largest bank failure in U.S. history after Washington Mutual’s in 2008.

That money created out of thin air should one day evaporate before our eyes should surprise no one, except perhaps Paul Krugman and his fellow court jesters at the New York Times. The endless cycles of boom and bust are a direct result of government manipulation of the money supply. It’s really that profound and that simple.

Stephen Apolito

Stephen Apolito is a CPA living in Bronxville, New York. A veteran of the US Air Force, Apolito is a graduate of Washington and Lee University and has taught in the New York City public schools.

June 22, 2023

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Source

https://mises.org/wire/banks-create-money-out-thin-air-what-could-possibly-go-wrong


Saturday, October 12, 2024

Asset Inflation Cycles: Modern-Day Form of Inflation

Asset Inflation Cycles: Modern-Day Form of Inflation

Joseph G. Carson

Feb 5, 2024

In the last twenty-five years, asset price cycles have become more dominant in business cycle analysis, and in doing so, asset inflation cycles have become the modern-day form of inflation. Their importance has become so critical that they have become an explicit part of monetary policy via its new tool, quantitative purchases, whose primary purpose is to increase asset prices/values. With the Federal Reserve now a key player, do asset price cycles still exhibit similar boom and bust patterns as was the case in the past? Or can monetary policy permanently elevate asset prices above and beyond economic and financial fundamentals?

Asset Price Cycles

Several theories help to explain why asset price cycles have become more significant and more volatile over the past twenty-five years.

First, monetary policymakers changed its operating framework in the mid-to-late 1990s, just before the asset price tech bubble. Policymakers abandoned the money supply and credit anchors and started to track real official interest (i.e., Fed Funds level less consumer price index). That created an informal price-targeting policy regime, which years later became formal and removed a policy framework that responded to financial conditions and imbalances that could trigger future inflation or economic problems. Ever since the change in its framework, policymakers have refused to use official rates to dampen speculative and significant asset price cycles.

Second, in the late 1990s, BLS removed the house price signal (i.e., it stopped surveying owner homes for the rent calculation) from its measure of consumer price inflation. That change further broke the link between real estate and consumer price inflation and changed the correlation between real estate and equity prices to positive from negative. So, real and financial asset price cycles became mutually inclusive, which was the opposite of what was usually the case in previous cycles.

Third, globalization (i.e., the ability to import cheap goods) played a role in the US inflation cycle as it helped dampen goods price inflation. With monetary policy shifted exclusively to reported inflation and less to financial conditions, tame consumer price inflation contributed to investors speculating, and often winning that monetary policy will remain easy regardless of asset inflation.

Asset price cycles do not generate public outcry as general inflation cycles, even though history shows they can be equally destructive and destabilizing. That could be because asset price upswings can generate substantial wealth gains while general inflation penalizes everyone. Yet, policymakers have a mandate for financial stability, so they must stand up against the crowd even if it's politically unpopular.

Asset price imbalances or bubbles are hard to detect in real-time and can last long. Yet, one can gain perspective by comparing current market valuations of real and financial assets to past periods of boom and bust.

During the tech bubble, the market value of the real estate and equities on household balance sheets to nominal GDP spiked to a record 2.5 times, falling back to below two during the bust (see chart). The housing bubble helped fuel a more significant spike in market valuations to roughly three times GDP, and again, history repeated itself, as it often does in finance, with market valuation falling back to below two.

The Fed's QE 1 program helped asset prices recover ground lost during the Great Financial Recession, and QE 2 has pushed asset values to GDP to a new record high. Based on Q4 changes in asset prices and GDP, the ratio is estimated at 3.5, just shy of the record high at the end of 2021. If history were to repeat itself, it would take a 35% to 40% decline in both real estate and equity values to match the fall in the Asset/GDP ratio following the tech and housing bubbles. That is not a forecast but an illustration of how far current valuation have deviated from trend. Liquid assets correct sooner and more sharply than real assets so the equity and real estate declines, if they do occur, would not be proportional.

Can monetary policy permanently increase the nominal values of real and financial assets with its new policy tool (QE)? Monetary policy can make things look better and last longer, and QE has done that. But to permanently increase the earnings power and asset valuations is not something monetary policy can do. Every excessive asset and non-asset price cycle in history eventually broke for one reason or another. The current cycle should be no different.

Policymakers are debating when to reduce official rates because general inflation has slowed. Reducing official rates would be a significant policy mistake because of the price imbalance in the asset markets. Instead, policymakers should comprehensively review their policies because the economy's performance, evident with the strong job and wage gains in January, says the total stance of monetary policy remains too easy. In doing the review policymakers will learn that their new tool of quantitative purchases offsets a significant chunk of their official rate policy. In the current climate, it makes more sense to accelerate the reduction of the Fed's balance sheet than to lower official rates.

  • Joseph G. Carson, Former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein.   Joseph G. Carson joined Alliance Bernstein in 2001. He oversaw the Economic Analysis team for Alliance Bernstein Fixed Income and has primary responsibility for the economic and interest-rate analysis of the US. Previously, Carson was chief economist of the Americas for UBS Warburg, where he was primarily responsible for forecasting

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  • Source

  •  https://www.haver.com/articles/asset-inflation-cycles-modern-day-form-of-inflation

Friday, October 11, 2024

Brendan Caldwell’s Top Picks for October 11, 2024

Brendan Caldwell’s Top Picks for October 11, 2024


Brendan Caldwell, president and CEO, Caldwell Investment Management

Tuesday, October 8, 2024

Norman Rothery: Portfolios for dividend and value investors

Norman Rothery: Portfolios for dividend and value investors

Norman Rothery, Oct 6, 2024

I’m pleased to provide updates to the Stable Dividend portfolio and my other popular portfolios below. The portfolios are all based on stock screens of differing levels of complexity that are described in detail in separate articles.

I hope to update the portfolios every two to four weeks, with allowances made for the unusual periods that life provides – and a vacation from time to time.

Canadian Portfolios

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U.S. Portfolios

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Notes: Data from Bloomberg as of the close of October 1, 2024.

Norm has an interest in some of the stocks shown.

Yield = indicated dividend yield, Volatility = annualized volatility over the past 260 days, P/E = price to earnings over the past four quarters, P/CF = price to cash flow over the past four quarters, P/B = price to book value, six (or 12) month return = total return over the past six (or 12) months including reinvested dividends, EV = enterprise value, EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes over the past four quarters, FCF = free cash flow, Market Cap = market capitalization in millions of dollars, U.S portfolios are presented in U.S. dollar terms.

A Customary Caution

Use our portfolios and stock screens as a starting point for further research. Be sure to improve your understanding of each company by studying it and its industry in more detail. Confirm the data herein before using it.

Watch your step with stocks that trade infrequently, and those with very low share prices, because they may be difficult to buy or sell in a cost-effective manner.

Before dashing off to the market, recognize the built-in limitations of quantitative methods such as ours. For instance, less tangible factors such as the quality of a company’s management can sometimes help – or hinder – a business.

And while we hope our portfolios achieve similar returns to those in the back-tests, the market isn’t that predictable. Even in the best circumstances, we expect results to be bumpy and some individual stocks will disappoint. We would be pleased indeed for the portfolios to outperform the market over the course of a few decades.

Norman Rothery, PhD, CFA, is the founder of StingyInvestor.com.

Be smart with your money. Get the latest investing insights delivered right to your inbox three times a week, with the Globe Investor newsletter. Sign up today.

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The GlobeandMail Newspaper, Toronto, Canada

Monday, October 7, 2024

TC Energy spun off South Bow this week. Its dividend is hard to ignore

TC Energy spun off South Bow this week. Its dividend is hard to ignore

David Berman, Oct 4, 2024

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Spinoffs can be bittersweet affairs for small investors. When a company hives off a division, you get a shiny new stock with a fresh start. But what are you going to do if you’re saddled with a trivial number of shares?

This question may be on the minds of investors after TC Energy Corp. TRP-T completed its restructuring this week.

The Calgary-based energy infrastructure company separated its oil pipelines from assets that include natural gas pipelines and storage. For every one share in TC Energy, investors received an additional 0.2 shares in a new company called South Bow Corp. SOBO-T

If a small investor held, say, 100 shares prior to the restructuring, their portfolio now has 20 shares in South Bow, valued at $580 when regular trading began on Oct. 2.

Nothing wrong with that. Well, unless your portfolio is growing unwieldy with small holdings after other spinoffs. Or, if the new shares – whatever number of them – are an insignificant slice of your overall portfolio.

Either way, spinoffs can demand further action: Buy more to build meaningful exposure to a company or sell what you have to focus your bets.

For South Bow, there’s a strong case for buying more if you want steady income from a generous dividend.

Spinoffs, in general, have been producing strong returns this year, supporting the argument that narrowly focused companies can perform better when they are carved out of unwieldy conglomerates.

The S&P U.S. Spin-Off Index, which tracks U.S. stocks that have been birthed from parent companies within the past four years – yeah, there’s a benchmark for just about everything – is up about 24 per cent in 2024, not including dividends. It outperformed the S&P 500 by four percentage points over the same period.

These spinoffs include GE Vernova Inc., up 80 per cent since the energy equipment company emerged from the former General Electric Co. in April, and Veralto Corp., up 43 per cent since the water treatment company was spun out of Danaher Corp. about a year ago.

Granted, it’s hard to imagine South Bow soaring by double digits over the next year.

The company – which transports Canadian crude oil to refining markets in the U.S. Midwest and Gulf Coast through the Keystone Pipeline System – begins life with a lot of debt: $7.5-billion, or 5.2 times 2023 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).

Dividend payments currently eat up all of its profits, dimming prospects for immediate dividend growth until the high payout ratio declines.

And growth is likely to be modest at best. That’s because 88 per cent of cash flow comes from long-term contracts with oil producers and refiners, while additional pipeline capacity can be constrained by a tough regulatory environment.

In this sense, South Bow resembles a utility that offers stability over explosive profit potential. But is that such a bad thing?

Canadian utilities are no slouches right now. The sector has rallied 12 per cent over the past three months, outperforming the S&P/TSX Composite Index as investors warm to attractive dividends and economically defensive stocks.

What’s more, South Bow’s annualized dividend is a big one, at US$2 a share. When the stock officially launched this week – conditional trading began on Sept. 25 – the implied yield based on future dividend payments was a dazzling 9.3 per cent.

If that were any other company – say, a struggling telecom or a real estate investment trust with exposure to vacant office space – the high yield might raise a red flag over the payout’s sustainability. But the likelihood of South Bow, with its long track record, running into financial trouble right out of the gate seems unlikely.

The company has put debt reduction at the top of its to-do list, and expects it can reduce its debt-to-EBITDA ratio from five to as low as 4.5 within three years.

Moody’s Ratings, S&P Global Ratings and Fitch Ratings have rewarded South Bow with an investment-grade stamp of approval, supporting the case that the company has some financial flexibility here.

Just don’t count on a bigger dividend any time soon. Robert Catellier, an analyst at CIBC Capital Markets, expects that the payout ratio will remain above 100 per cent through 2027, implying that dividend hikes won’t happen for at least three years.

With a yield above 9 per cent, though, investors are being nicely compensated while they wait.

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The GlobeandMail Newspaper, Toronto, Canada